

Message Text

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ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ADP-00 EB-11 OIC-04 USIE-00 NSCE-00

SSO-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-15 AF-10 EUR-25

FAA-00 CAB-09 COME-00 DOTE-00 RSR-01 /138 W

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O P 251933Z AUG 73

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9562

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

USMISSION USUN NY

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 6717

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - T E X T

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ICAO, ETRN, PFOR, IS

SUBJECT: ICAO AIR SECURITY CONFERENCE: ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

REF: STATE 169579

1. I CALLED ON EBAN FIVE PM AUGUST 25 WITH EMBOFF AT FONMIN'S HOME NORTH OF TEL AVIV. I MADE ALL THE POINTS IN DEPARTMENT'S ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION (PARAS 2 THROUGH 6 REFTEL), AND EBAN WHO WAS ALONE TOOK ROUGH NOTES. FOR TACTICAL PURPOSES I FIRST STRESSED US DETERMINATION TO DO ALL IT COULD TO CONTAIN SITUATION AT ROME MEETING.

I THEN OBSERVED THAT MY CALL WAS IN EFFECT CONTAINUATION OF DISUSSION WE HELD LAST TUESDAY AND NOTED USEFUL CONVERSATION BETWEEN ACTING SECRETARY AND AMBASSADOR DINITZ YESTERDAY.

2. I INFORMED EBAN WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS OF (A) IMPORTANCE US ATTACHES TO ISSUANCE OF STATEMENT OF GOI BEFORE ROME MEETING CONVENES TO DISPEL APPREHEHSIONS ABOUT ISRAELI FUTURE INTENTIONS,
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AROUSED MAINLY BY PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY DEFMIN DAYAN; AND (B)

US VIEW THAT LINE WE CAN HOPE TO HOLD AT ROME WILL BE DEFINED
BY ISRAELI POSTURE ON FUTURE INTENTIONS AS PERCEIVED BY MAJORITY.

3. EBAN SAID THAT FOLLOWING OUR PREVIOUS TALK HE HAD HELP MEETING TO

DISUCSS THIS SUBJECT WITH APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS OF TRANSPORT AND
FOREIGN MINISTRIES AND ALSO HAD RECEIVED REPORTS FROM ROME.
HE DID NOT YET KNOW WHAT ARAB GAMBIT WOULD BE. AS FOR EXPULSION, ICAO

DIRECTOR GENERAL HAD SAID HE WOULD INTERVENE AGAINST ANY SUCH MOVE AS
ILLEGAL. DIRGEN THOUGHT THIS WOULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE EFFECT ON
NEUTRALS. THIS, MORE LIMITED RESTRICTIONS WERE THE PROBLEM
FOR ISRAEL, BUT SITUATION WAS SERIOUS. ISRAEL DID NOT WANT TO JOIN
CATEGORY OF SOUTH AFRICA AND PORTUGAL IN POLITICAL SENSE, NOT TO
MENTION PHYSICAL DIFFICULTIES RESTRICTIONS COULD ENTAIL. ISRAELI
CIVIL AIRCRAFT WOULD CONTINUE FLYING, BUT IT WOULD BE HARD.

4. PARADOXICALLY, EBAN CONTINUED, ISRAELI INSTRUCTIONS FOR
ROME MEETING DRAFTED BEFORE AUGUST 10 ADVOCATED INTERNATIONAL
LEGISLATION AIMED AT EXCLUSION OF ANY DIVERSION OF CIVIL AIRCRAFT.
THIS CONTINUED TO BE ISRAELI POSITION. IF PEOPLE SAID AUGUST 10
ACTION WAS AT VARIANCE WITH SUCH POSITION, ISRAELI ANSWER WAS PREVIOUS

HISTORICAL RECORD, INCLUDING ACTIONS OF GOVERNMENTS SUCH AS
DRAMATIC LIBYAN FORCING DOWN OF BRITISH AIRCRAFT. IF INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL AVIATION COMMUNITY WERE NOW TO PRESENT PROPOSAL IN SOME
FORM CALLING FOR ALL STATES TO COOPERATE IN PREVENTING AND IMPEDING
ANY INTERCEPTION INCLUDING REFUSAL OF SANCTUARY TO INTERCEPTORS,
ISRAEL WOULD JOIN AND WOULD SUPPORT STRINGENT MEASURES
AGAINST VIOLATIONS.

5. EBAN SAID HE WOULD BE PRESENTING THIS POSITION AT CABINET
MEETING AUGUST 26, AND IT WOULD FIND PUBLIC EXPRESSION IN ISRAEL
OR AT ROME. IN FACT, FORECAST OF SPEECH TO BE MADE BY ISRAEL
AT ROME MEETING MIGHT BE GOOD IDEA TO HELP PREVENT CRYSTALIZATION
OF POSITIONS, AS I SUGGESTED.

6. EBAN EXPLAINED NOSE COUNT ISRAELIS HAD DONE INDICATED NO
EXPULSION. VARIOUS ARAB AIR ORGANIZATIONS HAD CALLED FOR TABLING
OF EXPULSION RESOLUTION, BUT THEY HAD NO STANDING. LEBANON USE
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THE REAL PLAINTIFF. IF RESTRICTIONS SHOULD BE PASSED AGAINST
ISRAELI PARTICIPATION AT CERTAIN ICAO MEETINGS, ISRAEL WOULD TURN
UP ANYWAY AND SEE WHAT WOULD HAPPEN. BUT GOI REGARDED PORTUGAL-
SOUTH AFRICA TYPE RESTRICTIONS AS DEFINITE DANGER. ISRAEL WAS
IN CONTACT WITH OTHER AVIATION STATES AND THEIR AIRLINES. TWENTY
COUNTRIES WERE CRITICAL BECAUSE THEY HANDLED BULK OF WORLD
AVIATION; TWENTY ALSO WAS NUMBER OF COUNTRIES HAVING AIR LINKS
WITH ISRAEL.

7. EBAN PREDICTED THAT IF LEGISLATION IS PUT FORWARD AT ROME WITH TEETH IN IT AGAINST INTERCEPTION AND GOVERNMENTAL AID TO INTERCEPTION, ISRAEL WOULD BE FOR AND ARABS AGAINST. ISRAEL'S GENERAL POSTURE WAS GOOD. IT WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE FOR ISRAEL TO STAND UP AND SAY ISRAELIS MADE TERRIBLE MISTAKE AUGUST 10. BUT ISRAEL COULD MAKE STATEMENT NOT REFERRING TO PAST BUT SAYING GOI WOULD COOPERATE IN FUTURE WITH LEGISLATION UNRESERVEDLY EXCLUDING INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL AVIATION. THERE MIGHT ALSO BE STATEMENT INDICATING ISRAEL DID NOT CONSIDER AUGUST 10 ACTION TO BE NORMAL THING. PUBLICITY ALONG THESE LINES WAS POSSIBLE BY MONDAY, AS EBAN APPRECIATED ARABS MIGHT SEEK PRIORITY AT ROME FOR THEIR GAMBIT. EBAN ADDED HE WANTED AT SAME TIME TO BE CLEAR: HE DID NOT THINK CABINET WOULD DENOUNCE AUGUST 10 ACTION. BUT ISRAEL COULD AVOID STATEMENTS CREATING APPREHENSION THAT EVERY TIME HABASH MOUNTED AIRPLANE, IAF WOULD ACT. THIS HAD NOT BEEN ISRAELI INTENTION, BUT EBAN COULD SEE HOW SUCH APPREHENSIONS CAME ABOUT.

8. AT END OF CONVERSATION I ALLUDED TO COMMENT BY AMBASSADOR DINITZ TO ACTING SECRETARY TO EFFECT THAT IN PUBLIC MIND (I SAID I ASSUMED DINITZ MEANT PUBLIC IN ISRAEL) THERE WAS IMPRESSION OF DETERIORATION IN US-ISRAELI RELATIONS. I HAD NOT DETECTED THIS SINCE MY ARRIVAL; IN FACT, QUITE THE OPPOSITE. EBAN WAS EQUALLY PUZZLED, SAYING HE FOUND NO REFLECTION OF SUCH A PUBLIC MOOD IN ISRAELI PRESS AND DID NOT SHARE DINITZ' IMPRESSION.

9. COMMENT. ATMOSPHERE WAS MOST CORDIAL THROUGHOUT MEETING. I HAD APPROACHED TASK WITH A LITTLE APPREHENSION BECAUSE OF NATURE OF INSTRUCTIONS. BUT EBAN'S AMENABLE ATTITUDE DISPELLED ANY POSSIBLE IMPRESSION THAT US HAD ANYTHING BUT ISRAEL'S BEST INTERESTS AT HEART AND SHOWED HE FELT WE HAD COME UP WITH WORTHWHILE
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SUGGESTION.
KEATING

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